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Definitions  
Neo-Gramscianism is a theoretical approach rooted in the Marxist political thought. The 
idea originated from Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), an Italian Marxist theoretician and 
politician who was a founding member and one-time leader of the Communist Party of 
Italy. Most of his influential works were not outlined as a coherent system of thought 
but rather come in the form of fragmentary (and sometimes contradictory) notes written 
during his time of imprisonment by Benito Mussolini's fascist regime. Nonetheless, 
Gramsci managed to articulate important concepts which have proved useful for an 
enriched understanding and analysis of politics and relations of power not only in 
capitalist societies but also in the context of international relations and global 
governance (Bieler 2005; Bieler and Morton 2014; Cox 1981, 1983, 1996; Gill 1993). 
 
 
Like for Marxism, the starting point of Gramscianism is the idea that the analysis 
of politics and political struggle is best situated within the context of class formation 
and social relations of production (Marx 2000). The critical point of departure from 
Marxism is the Gramscian articulation of the concept of cultural hegemony, which 
describes how ruling elites in Western capitalist states use a combination of idea, 
organizational, and discursive practices to build and maintain societal relations of power 
(Gramsci 1971). Hence, contrary to a classical Marxist formulation where the 
relationship between the dominant class and the subordinate class is characterized in 
terms of continual struggle and dominion, a Gramscian account posits a far more 
dialectical, complex and largely stable relationship in which capitalism and control are 
maintained as much through idea as through the coercive and bureaucratic apparatus of 
the state. By stressing the role of idea in maintaining control, Gramsci advances an 
understanding of power that is not solely economistic or coercive but also derives from 
institutional and discursive forces (see also CONSTRUCTIVISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM; GOVERNMENTALITY). Gramsci, to be clear, does not deny the 
importance of coercive power but he insists that moral and intellectual leadership is the 
basic form of authority and tool for domination in any hegemonic social structure (Cox 
1983, p. 137; Lee 1995, p. 150; Levy and Newell 2005, p. 49-50). 
The key intent and manifestation of cultural hegemony is that the social order 
which reproduces the dominant position of the ruling class is widely accepted as the 
consensus and common sense value for all people. The result of this consensus -- which 
by the way should not be misunderstood as either unity or harmony -- is a common 
social and moral language which erodes the legitimacy of radical alternatives and works 
to forge an inter-subjective identity throughout the CIVIL SOCIETY in ways that support 
 
 
the prevailing order. Gramsci suggests that the key to entrenchment and survival of the 
hegemony is that the dominant class is able to link its interests with those of the 
subordinate classes in the pursuit of a social order that reproduces its own dominant 
position (Gramsci 1971, p. 181). It also entails that the ruling class is able to fabricate 
and promote discourses that conceal contradictions while creating a sense of accord that 
transcends class divides.  
Gramsci noted that hegemonic stability is rooted in the institutions of civil 
society, including the school, the council, the media and the church all of which, to the 
extent that the hegemony has been successfully established, become the key sites for 
ideological reproduction, providing legitimacy through the assertion of moral and 
intellectual leadership. This conception of social relations led Gramsci to formulate a far 
more elastic and less bounded meaning for both the STATE and the civil society (Jessop 
1990). On this view, the state is conceived not as just as the administrative, executive 
and coercive apparatus of government but also ‘the underpinnings of the political 
structure of the civil society’ (Gill 1993, p. 51). In short the civil society is seen an 
‘extended state’.  
Similarly, the civil society and social institutions, for their part also have a dual 
existence. These sites are at once both crucial for maintaining hegemony through 
intellectual leadership and for counter-hegemonic struggles. In other words, a complex 
and dialectical relationship is posed where the civil society becomes as Ford (2003, p. 
132) puts it, ‘simultaneously a site for the maintenance of, as well as the challenge, to 
the hegemony’. 
Furthermore, in order achieve hegemony; Gramsci says the ruling elite will tend 
to move away from its narrow economic-corporate interest to form alliances with a 
 
 
variety of other forces. Although this alliance -- which Gramsci sometimes referred to 
as a historic bloc -- has an inner core, the specific configuration is often contingent and 
frequently under assault. To maintain hegemony the historic bloc will often engage in 
astute bargaining and ideological contestation, while making a series of non-core 
threatening compromises (Simon 1982, p. 37) to neutralize the radical other.  
Utilizing the language of military science, Gramsci described the strategic moves 
by the subordinate classes and the ruling elite to change and preserve hegemony as ‘the 
war of position’ and ‘passive revolution’, respectively. A war of position is a process of 
alliance formation and discursive practices by the subordinate class designed to gain 
influence within cultural institutions while avoiding direct confrontation. Passive 
revolution refers to ‘a process of reformist change from above, which entails some 
concessions by the historic bloc in an effort to preserve the essential aspects of social 
structure’ (Levy and Egan 2003, p. 807). Hence a very broad view of agency is 
recognized without diminishing the importance of structural constraints. In sum, social 
struggle and change are far less dependent on violence and radicalism but more on 
ideological contestations and accommodations.  
 
Key Findings 
 
Overview of Role in Global Environmental Governance 
Gramscian concepts have been utilized by scholars to analyze and illuminate various 
aspects of GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE. A foremost application of neo-
Gramscianism to the scholarship on global environmental governance has been in 
challenging the basic premise of orthodox regime theory that international 
 
 
environmental rule-making is the exclusive preserve of state actors (see also 
NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM; REGIMES). In one of the first explicit offerings, Levy 
and Newell (2002) used Gramscian concepts to explain not only the significant role of 
business actors in international environmental negotiation but also their influence on 
state positions in international climate diplomacy. Although there had been prior 
recognition of the role of the non-state actors in global environmental politics (cf. 
Wapner 1995), the appeal to Gramscianism enabled Levy and Newell (2002) to offer a 
rich articulation that illuminates a number of interesting aspects to this phenomenon. 
Their account revealed the intimate and dialectical connection between states and 
business, the role of strategic alliance formation between state and non-state actors, and 
how the corporate sector deploys this alliance and contingent discursive and 
organizational practices to develop and protect their core interests (see also 
TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; PRIVATE SECTOR).   
Other scholars such as Ford (2003), Newell (2008) and Okereke et al. (2009) have 
subsequently deployed the Gramscian theory to analyze the proliferation and strategic 
impact of social movements, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and other non-state actors in global environmental governance. Drawing from 
Gramciain insights Ford (2003) calls for the need to avoid treating all civil society 
actors as a homogenous group. Instead, one has to recognize their various positions in 
and relationship within the exiting ‘hegemonic constellation’ (p. 129). This, she argues, 
allows for a more nuanced reading that reveals when civil society groups are acting to 
truly challenge or reproduce the status quo. Okereke et al. (2009) advance a similar 
argument noting that, inasmuch as the civil society in Gramscian terms is ‘an extended 
state’, a far more cautious view on the much vaunted power and authority shift from the 
 
 
state to non-state actors as well as their critical ability to change things is warranted. 
They called for more research into how certain sections of the civil society may be 
complementing the disciplinary forces of the capitalist state and transnational 
hegemonic bloc.  
In highlighting the agency of the civil society and other non-state actors through 
the prism of Gramscianism, scholars have noted the need to pay attention to the multi-
dimensional nature of power and the various forms through which power is manifested 
in global environmental governance. In this regard, particular attention has been paid to 
the role of discursive and organizational power. Bernstein (2001, 2002) attempted to 
combine a Gramscian approach with constructivism and subsequently deployed the 
resultant ‘socio-evolutionary’ approach to account for the prevalence of particular 
norms in global environmental governance. He argued that these hegemonic or field-
shaping norms are generally legitimized through organizational and discursive practices 
(see also LIBERAL ENVIRONMENTALISM). Invoking Gramscian concepts, Okereke (2008) 
sought to demonstrate the importance and use of discursive power in global 
environmental regimes suggesting that ‘framing, presentation and style of 
argumentation do impact the chances for the internalization of equity norms’ (p. 34).  
Levy and Newell (2002; 2005), Ford (2003), and Levy and Egan (2003) have all 
sought to draw attention to the structural and organizational power of various actors in 
global environmental governance. Stephan (2011) used a Gramscian approach to 
highlight not just the role of discursive aspects of power but also the agency of 
individual actors in establishing the European Union emissions trading system (EU 
ETS) in the early late 1990s. More recently, Bratman (2015) has relied on Gramscian 
insights on hegemony, passive revolution and wars of position to show how the GREEN 
 
 
ECONOMY can be used as a discursive tool by states and their business allies to fracture 
and weaken radical oppositions from social justice and environmental activist alliances 
campaigning for radical visions of the green economy. 
In general Gramscian scholars stress that power is not static, zero sum, or one-
dimensional. They underscore the point that power resides not only in the entities and 
the material resources at their command but also in their strategies, tactics and the 
unique configuration of alliances and coalitions. This means that in some cases groups 
with less abundant material resources but astute tactics are able to outmanoeuvre those 
with superiors’ resources.    
It is obvious from the foregoing that the Gramscian theory is very sensitive to the 
role and importance of political contestations, accommodations and compromises, 
which many have noted as the ‘stuff’ of environmental governance. Levy and Newell 
(2002) have emphasized the need to pay more attention to international environmental 
REGIMES as the ‘outcome of a process of bargaining, compromise, and alliance 
formation at the level of specific regime’. By noting the role of micro processes of 
bargaining and compromising, they argue, scholars of global environmental governance 
are better able to explain the inevitable if limited degree of indeterminacy in the 
outcome of regimes. This view is different from the regime theory which suggests a 
more totalizing outcome based on economic and military configurations of power. 
Clearly then neo-Gramscianism is far less deterministic than Marxism. In fact Gale 
(1998, p. 253) inspired by Gramci specially characterized international organizations as 
‘arenas of struggle between global actors over the normative structures that govern (or 
should govern) specific issue areas’. 
 
 
Crucially, while a Gramscian analysis is sensitive to the counter-hegemonic 
potential of the subordinate class and the ever contested and changing contours of 
power in a social regime, it does not subscribe to the unlimited possibility of outcome. 
In fact the opposite is the case: while the bargaining process confers a certain level of 
indeterminacy on outcomes of regimes, it is more likely that regimes being the product 
of prevailing structures will ‘set boundaries as to what is achievable within a particular 
social order’ (Okereke 2008, p. 29). This point is crucial for distinguishing Gramsci 
from other pluralistic or sociological approaches, which highlight the role of normative 
and discursive contestation but fail to see the deep embeddedness of regimes in pre-
existing structures.  
Many scholars, e.g. Paterson (2000, 2009), Bernstein (2001), Newell (2008) and 
Wittneben et al. (2012), have provided detailed accounts of various aspects of the 
governance on CLIMATE CHANGE which show how the prior commitment to the 
neoliberal economic order serves to shape debates on what states and non-state actors 
can and cannot do in response to the threat of climate change. Drawing from Gramsci, 
Stephan (2011) demonstrates why emissions trading came to be adopted by the EU as 
their flagship policy. He argues that the implementation of the EU ETS was a form of 
passive revolution designed to neutralize the more radical idea of a carbon tax. 
Furthermore, he shows that the understanding of the structural constraints within which 
environmental decisions are made is critical for explaining why some polices are more 
likely to succeed while others are ‘met with fierce resistance and fail’. 
Similarly, Elah and Okereke (2015) argue on the basis of insights from 
Gramscianism that ‘the marketisation of key climate governance instruments’ such as 
the EU ETS and the Kyoto protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is due 
 
 
primarily to the hegemony of neoliberalism and the pervasive narrative that there is no 
alternative to market (Okereke 2006, p. 735) (see also LIBERAL ENVIRONMENTALISM). 
Görg and Brand (2000, 2006) go even further by questioning the pervasive assumption 
that international environmental regimes provide veritable platform for states to 
corporate to solve environmental problems. Drawing insights from Gramsci, they 
suggest that states have in fact transformed in both their shape and roles. They became 
vehicles for the commoditization of environmental resources and rendered such 
resources more susceptible to global capitalist competition and exploitation.    
 
Overview of Merits and Defects  
Notwithstanding the insights offered by neo-Gramscian ideas, the approach does have 
some drawbacks. Some of these have been articulated in the literature. Bernstein (2001), 
for example, acknowledges the utility of the neo-Gramscian approach in identifying the 
underlying class interests and structural forces that shape international environmental 
policies. However, he insists that the approach performs less well in explaining the 
‘actual dynamic processes’ through which these interests are legitimized. Similarly, 
while neo-Gramscian concepts are able to capture the macro-structural factors that 
determine the end-result of policies, they are less able to account for the constellation of 
micro socio-cultural dynamics that so often determine how a given policy plays out at 
the local level. Bernstein (2001) further argues that the neo-Gramscian approach 
ascribes too much importance to the role of capitalist development and relations of 
production while ignoring the role of values and norms in the development of 
environmental institutions. 
 
 
Okereke (2008) has defended the neo-Gramscian approach by suggesting that 
economic interests have mattered far more in the development of international 
environmental and climate policies than critiques admit. He however notes that the 
overwhelming emphasis on interest and economic calculus make neo-Gramscian 
analyses less able to grasp the role of moral values and norms in global environmental 
governance.  
Another line of critique on neo-Gramscianism is that despite acknowledging the 
agency of the civil society, the approach might still be read as being too deterministic. 
Bernstein (2001, p. 16) worries that the theory might be construed in terms of a passive 
struggle ‘where classes empowered by the current mode of global production ultimately 
triumph’ over the groups with less resources. Moreover, a loose reading of neo-
Gramscianism might still convey that there is little if any chance for an environmental 
regime that does not subordinate environmental concerns to the economic interest of 
businesses (Levy and Newell 2005). 
It is true that the neo-Gramscian approach places emphasis on the top-down 
structures of governance and on the structural constraints in the path of change. 
However, a thorough reading as indicated by Levy and Newell (2005, p. 51) makes it 
clear that Gramsci allows for the ‘role of agency and strategy in challenging groups with 
superior resources’. They draw attention to the fact that Gramsci himself warns 
explicitly against deterministic structural accounts of history, saying: ‘The active 
politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does he move 
in the turbid voice of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective 
reality… but does so in order to dominate and transcend it’ (cited in Levy and Newell 
2005, p. 51). Gramsci fully acknowledges that the relationship between the hegemonic 
 
 
group and the subordinate classes is very active and dynamic consisting in a series of 
moves and counter-moves intended to negotiate and renegotiate policy forms and 
ultimately the ‘limits of possibility’. Yet, since structure and agency are theorized as 
having a mutually determining relationship, it is difficult to pinpoint the concrete chains 
of causation (Uitermark 2005).   
 
Outlook  
Given the utility of neo-Gramscian ideas, as demonstrated by the scholarship discussed, 
it is surprising that the approach has not been deployed more widely in the scholarship 
on global environmental governance. One reason could lie in Wapner’s (1997) 
observation regarding the difficulties involved in transposing the Gramscian idea of 
civil society in Western democracies to the global level. Drawing from a range of 
authors, he noted that the concept of civil society is historically specific such that there 
are serious conceptual difficulties in speaking of a global civil society. 
However, Levy and Newell (2005, p. 54) have noted that while much of 
Gramsci’s writing focused on the national context, he nonetheless recognized that 
‘capitalism and class consciousness traversed national boundaries’ such that the 
approach does have potent application in analyzing international relations. Moreover, as 
Wapner (1997, p. 73) himself acknowledges, the concept of the global civil society 
retains analytical importance ‘when it becomes apparent that the same type of space as 
well as similar affections and relations that define society at the domestic level are 
prevalent at the global one’.     
The historically contingent nature of the global civil society has not been a major 
challenge to the application of the neo-Gramscian framework. This is evidenced by a 
 
 
growing list of political theorists and international relations scholars deploying 
Gramscian concepts to analyze globalization (Robinson 2005), global capitalism and 
world order (Rupert 2003, 2005). Gramscian concepts of power, hegemony, agency, 
social relations of production, the extended state and civil society considerably enrich 
our analysis of global environmental governance. To end on a provocative note, it may 
in fact be that the reluctance to take Gramsci more seriously reflects a growing 
theoretical tameness in the field.  
 
References  
Adamson, W.L. (1980), Hegemony and revolution: a study of Antonio Gramsci's 
political and cultural theory, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Andrée, P. (2011), ‘Civil society and the political economy of GMO failure in Canada: 
a neo-Gramscian analysis’, Environmental Politics, 20, 173-191. 
Bieler, A. (2005), ‘Class struggle over the EU model of capitalism: neo-Gramscian 
perspectives and the analysis of European integration’, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 8 (4), 513-526. 
Bieler, A. and A. Morton (eds) (2014), Images of Gramsci: connections and contentions 
in political theory and international relations, London: Routledge. 
Bratman, E. (2015), ‘Passive revolution in the green economy: Activism and the Belo 
Monte Dam’, International Environmental Agreements: Law, Politics, Society 
(forthcoming). 
 
 
Cox, R.W. (1981), ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international 
relations theory’, Millennium, 10 (2), 126-155. 
Cox, R.W. (1983), ‘Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in 
method’, in R.W. Cox and T.J. Sinclair (eds) (1996), Approaches to world order, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ford, L.H. (2003), ‘Challenging Global Governance: Social Movement Agency and 
global civil society’, Global Environmental Politics, 3 (2), 120-134. 
Forgacs, D. (1988), A Gramsci reader, London: Lawerence and Wishart Limited. 
Gale, F. (1998), ‘Cave “Cave! Hic dragones”: a neo-Gramscian deconstruction and 
reconstruction of international regime theory’, Review of international political 
economy, 5 (2), 252-283. 
Gill, S. (ed.) (1993), Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations, vol. 
26, Cambridge University Press. 
Görg, C. and U. Brand (2000), ‘Global environmental politics and competition between 
nation-states: on the regulation of biological diversity’, Review of International 
Political Economy, 7 (3), 371-398. 
Görg, C. and U. Brand (2006), ‘Contested regimes in the international political 
economy: global regulation of genetic resources and the internationalization of the 
state’, Global Environmental Politics, 6 (4), 101-123. 
Gramsci, A. (1971), Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, New 
York: International Pubs. 
 
 
Jessop, B. (1990), State theory: putting the capitalist state in its place, University Park, 
PA: Penn State University Press. 
Lee, K. (1995), ‘A Neo-Gramscian approach to International organisation: an expanded 
analysis of current reforms to UN development activities’, in J. Macmillan and A. 
Linklater (eds), Boundaries and Questions New Directions in International 
Relations, London and New York: Pinter Press. 
Levy, D.L. and D. Egan (2003), ‘A neo-Gramscian approach to corporate political 
strategy: conflict and accommodation in the climate change negotiations’, Journal 
of Management Studies, 40, 803-829. 
Levy, D.L. and P. Newell (2002), ‘Business strategy and international environmental 
governance: toward a neo-Gramscian synthesis’, Global Environmental Politics, 
2: 84-101. 
Levy, D.L. and P. Newell (2005), ‘A Neo-Gramscian approach to business in 
International Environmental Politics: an interdisciplinary, multilevel framework’, 
in D.L. Levy and P. Newell (eds), The Business of Global Environmental 
Governance, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, pp. 47-69. 
Marx, K. (2000), Karl Marx: selected writings, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morton, A.D. (2007), Unravelling Gramsci: hegemony and passive revolution in the 
global political economy, London: Pluto Press. 
Newell, P. (2008), ‘The political economy of global environmental governance’, Review 
of International Studies, 34 (3), 507-529. 
 
 
Okereke, C. (2008), ‘Equity norms in global environmental governance’, Global 
Environmental Politics, 8 (3), 25-50. 
Okereke, C., H. Bulkeley and H. Schroeder (2009), ‘Conceptualizing climate 
governance beyond the international regime’, Global Environmental Politics, 9 
(1), 58-78. 
Paterson, M. (2000), Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination, 
Accumulation and Resistance, Houndmills: Macmillan. 
Paterson, M. (2009), ‘Post‐hegemonic climate politics?’, The British Journal of Politics 
& International Relations, 11 (1), 140-158. 
Robinson, W. (1996), Promoting polyarchy: Globalisation, U.S. intervention, and 
hegemony, New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Robinson, W.I. (2005), ‘Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation‐State to Transnational 
Hegemony’, Critical review of international social and political philosophy, 8 (4), 
559-574. 
Rupert, M. (2003), ‘Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-) vision of 
the politics of governance/resistance’, Review of International Studies, 29 (S1), 
181-198. 
Rupert, M. (2005), ‘Reading Gramsci in an era of globalising capitalism’, Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8 (4), 483-497. 
Simon R. (1982), Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction, London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
 
 
Stephan, B. (2011), ‘The power in carbon. A neo-Gramscian explanation for the EU's 
Adoption of Emissions Trading’, in A. Engels (ed.), Global transformations 
towards a low carbon society 4 (working paper series), Hamburg: University of 
Hamburg/KlimaCampus. 
Uitermark, J. (2005), ‘The genesis and evolution of urban policy: a confrontation of 
regulationist and governmentality approaches’, Political Geography, 24: 137-163. 
Wapner, P. (1997), ‘Governance in Global Civil Society’, in O. Young (ed.), Global 
Governance Drawing Insight from Environmental Experience, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Wittneben, B.B., C. Okereke, S.B. Banerjee and D.L. Levy (2012), ‘Climate change and 
the emergence of new organizational landscapes’, Organization Studies, 33 (11), 
1431-1450. 
 
Recommended Literature  
Birchfield, V. (1999), ‘Contesting the hegemony of market ideology: Gramsci's “good 
sense” and Polanyi's “double movement”’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 6 (1), 27-54. 
Garrett, P.M. (2008), ‘Thinking with the Sardinian: Antonio Gramsci and social 
work’, European Journal of Social Work, 11 (3), 237-250. 
Germain, R.D. and M. Kenny (1998), ‘Engaging Gramsci: international relations theory 
and the new Gramscians’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1), 3-21. 
 
 
Gramsci, A. (2000), A Gramsci reader: selected writings, 1916-1935, Lawrence & 
Wishart. 
Katz, H. (2006), ‘Gramsci, hegemony, and global civil society networks’, Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 17 (4), 332-347. 
Mouffe, C. (1979), Gramsci and Marxist theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Rupert, M. (2005), ‘Reading Gramsci in an era of globalising capitalism’, Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8 (4), 483-497. 
Showstack Sassoon, A. (1982), Approaches to Gramsci, London: Writers and readers 
publishing cooperative society, Ltd. 
Showstack Sassoon, A. (1987), Gramsci's politics, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
 
